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(decided August, 12, 1999)
Defendant Henry was indicted for driving a vehicle at night
without lit headlights,2 reckless driving, 3 possession of a stolen
blue Honda,4 unauthorized use of the vehicle,5 and possession of
burglar tools.6 The defendant moved to suppress a pair of wire
181 Misc. 2d 689, 695 N.Y.S.2d 892 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1999).
2 VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 375.2A[1].
3 VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 1212 (providing in pertinent part: "Reckless driving
shall mean driving or using any motor vehicle... which... unreasonably
endangers users of the public highway. Every person violating this provision
shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.").
4 PENAL LAW §§ 165.50 and 165.45[5]. § 165.50 provides in pertinent part:
[a] person is guilty of criminal possession of stolen property in
the third degree when he knowingly possesses stolen property,
with intent to benefit himself... or impede recovery by an
owner thereof, and when the value of the property exceeds
three thousand dollars. Criminal possession of stolen property
in the third degree is a class D felony.") (§165.45[5] provides
in pertinent part "[a] person is guilty of criminal possession of
stolen property in the fourth degree when he knowingly
possesses stolen property, with intent to benefit himself... or
to impede the recovery by an owner thereof, and when: (1)
The value of the property exceeds one thousand dollars ......
Id.
5 PENAL LAW (§165.05 [1] (provides in pertinent part:
[a] person is guilty of unauthorized sue of a vehicle in the
third degree when (1) Knowing hat he does not have the
consent of the owner, the takes, operates... or otherwise uses
the vehicle. A person who engages in any such conduct
without the consent of the owner is presumed to know that he
does not have such consent."
Id.
6 PENAL LAW §140.35 provides in pertinent part: "[a] person is guilty of
possession of burglar's tools when he possesses any tool .... designed... for
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pliers, discovered during a search of his person, as wel as a
statement made to the arresting officer, on the grounds that the
officer was not authorized to search the defendant 7 At a Supreme
Court, Queens County hearing to decide defendant's motion to
suppress, the court's analysis focused on an examination of both
federal' and New York State9 constitutions as well as ease law.
The court concluded that both the defendant's statement and the
covered wire pliers were admissible.' The court disposed of the
issue of defendant's statement to the arresting officer by noting
that "since defendant was given his Miranda warnings, his
voluntary statement can be admitted into evidence at tral ... ."'
On January 12, 1999, Police Officer James Pelosi and Sergeant
George Norris, who were part of the Street Narcotics Enforcement
Unit, were driving in an unmarked car. 2 Upon stopping at an
intersection, the officers spotted defendant's car and noted that its
headlights were not turned on.13 After following the defendant's
committing... offenses involving larceny by a physical taking... evincing an
intent to use ... the same in the commission of an offense of such character."
Defendant was arrested for possession of wire cutters, screwdriver, mace,
macguar and socket, penlight and gloves.
' People v. Henry, 181 Misc. 2d 689, 691,695 N.Y.S.2d 892, 893.
8 U.S. CONST. amend. IV provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.
Id
9 N.Y. CONST, art. I, §12 (1999) provides in pertinent part:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers and effect, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized..
Id
10 Henry, 181 Misc. at 695, 695 N.Y.S.2d at 898.
11 Id at 691, 695 N.Y.S.2d at 895.
12 Id. at 690, 695 N.Y.S.2d at 893-94.
1 Id at 690, 695 N.Y.S.2d at 894.
2000 697
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car for an eighth of a mile, the officers turned on their siren and
emergency lights.14 The defendant sped up and attempted to lose
the officers by driving erratically while taking sharp turns and
accelerating quicdy but the defendant's car struck a curb causing a
flat tire. 5 The officers pulled alongside the defendant's car at
which time the defendant exited through the passenger door and
fled.' 6  Officer Pelosi pursued the defendant, shouting at the
defendant to stop while Sergeant Norris telephoned the aviation
7unit.
17
When the defendant was apprehended, he was not asked for his
license or registration and was not read his Miranda rights, until
after defendant asked why he was being apprehended.' 8 After
reading the defendant his Miranda rights, Officer Pelosi
handcuffed and searched the defendant.' 9 Officer Pelosi stated that
"after placing Mr. Henry under arrest and searching him for my
safety, I recovered a pair of wire pliers from his right front jacket
pocket."2
After being asked again by the defendant why he was arrested,
Officer Pelosi responded that he was being arrested for driving a
stolen vehicle.2' However, Officer Pelosi did not determine the
stolen status of the car until he took the defendant back to the
vehicle and discovered that the passenger door handle was jarred
and the glove compartment was broken and held together by a
string.'
The Court noted that "[I]t is well settled that a police officer may
lawfully stop a car where that officer has reasonable cause to
believe that the driver violated the vehicle and traffic law.'
However, in this case, the question before the court was whether
14 Id
15 Id




2 Id (quoting Transcript, page 14).
2" Henry, 181 Misc.2d at 690-91, 695 N.Y.S.2d at 894.
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an officer is authorized to search such a traffic offender or his car,
and if so, under what circumstances. The court began its analysis
by examining both New York state and federal case law on this
issue.
In 1967, the New York State Court of Appeals decided the case
of People v. Marsh24 in which it held that legislative design as well
as the Federal and State constitutional guarantees against
unreasonable searches and seizures will not sustain a
contemporaneous search of a person without more than a mere
custodial arrest for a traffic offense.' However a search would be
upheld if it can be justified as one for weapons.26 Thus "except in
rare instances, there can be no fruits of such traffic offenses"
unless the search can be justified as one for weapons.' The court
noted that a motorist who is stopped for a traffic infraction does
not indicate a propensity for violence and the officer does not have
a cause for thinking that he is in danger of being assaulted.' The
Marsh Court seemed to draw a distinction between criminal and
traffic offense arrests. 9
In 1973, the Court of Appeals addressed the issue of whether an
officer is authorized to search a person incidentally to a custodial
detention for a misdemeanor traffic violation in its decision of
People v. Adams.30 The court concluded that notwithstanding that
24 People v. Marsh, 20 N.Y.2d 98, 281 N.Y.S.2d 789, 228 N.E.2d 783 (N.Y.
1967). Defendant was arrested pursuant to an arrest warrant issued in 1965 for
speeding. Id Police officer searched defendant and discovered a book of
matches in defendant's pocket with a sheet of paper implicating him in the
playing of policy. Id. Defendant was then arrested and convicted for possession
of a policy slip. Id.
2s Marsh, 20 N.Y.2d at 101, 281 N.Y.S.2d at 792, 228 N.E.2d at 785
(emphasis added).
26 Id
27 Marsh, 20 N.Y.2d at 101,281 N.Y.S.2d at 792,228 N.E.2d at 785.
29 Marsh, 20 N.Y.2d at 101,281 N.Y.S.2d at 792,228 N.E.2d at 786.
29 Henry, 181 Misc.2d at 69, 695 N.Y.S. 2d at 895.
1o People v. Adams, 32 N.Y.2d 451, 453-54, 299 N.E.2d 653, 654, 346
N.Y.S.2d 229, 230 (N.Y. 1973). Defendant was arrested on the charge of
altering a car's identification number in violation of the Vehicle and Traffic
Law. Id The arresting officer then conducted a warrantless search of
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the arrest was for a misdemeanor, as opposed to an infraction, as
was the case in Marsh, the search incident to an arrest exception
would not sustain the search for this type of traffic misdemeanor."
In its analysis, the court examined the case of Coolidge v. New
lmpshire' which- noted that "searches conducted outside the
judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are
Per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment [of the U.S.
Constitution] subject only to a few specifically established and
well-delineated exceptions."33 The exceptions will only be applied
when there is a showing by those seeking exemption that the
search was imperative.'
The United States Supreme Court also addressed the issue of an
officer's authority to search incident to a lawful arrest in its 1973
decision of United States v. Robinson.35 The Court held that the
Fourth Amendment to the federal constitution allowed for searches
incident to a traffic violation arrest.36 The Supreme Court noted
that pursuant to the Fourth Amendment, a police officer's
judgment as to how and where to search a suspect, does not have to
be broken down into an analysis of each step of his search.37 The
Court held,
A custodial arrest of a suspect based on probable
cause is a reasonable intrusion under the Fourth
Amendment; that intrusion being lawful, a search
incident to the arrest requires no additional
justification. It is the fact of the lawful arrest which
establishes the authority to search, and we hold that
in the case of a lawful custodial arrest a full search
of the person is not only an exception to the warrant
31 Adams, 32 N.Y.2d at 455, N.E.2d at 655, 346 N.Y.S.2d at 232.
32 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
33 Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 454-55.
34id.
Is 414 U.S. 218 (1973). Defendant was arrested for operating a motor vehicle
after revocation of his driver's license and was searched without a warrant. Id.
The arresting officer discovered a crumpled cigarette package and heroin
capsules in the defendant's left breast pocket. Id.
36 d
37 Id. at 235.
700 [Vol 16
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requirement of the Fourth Amendment, but is also a
'reasonable' search under that Amendment"
The Adams issue was revisited by the New York Court of
Appeals in 1974 in the case of People v. Troiano.3 9 The Court took
this opportunity to address the United States Supreme Court's
decision in Robinson by noting that although it relied in part on the
Fourth Amendment of the Federal Constitution in its decisions of
Marsh and Adams, its decision on this issue "is primarily an
expression of State policy found in the State constitution .... '
People v. Troiano sets forth the current state of New York
constitutional law.4" The court held that the general rule is that
where an arrest is lawful, an incidental search is inevitable.4'
However there might be "an area of traffic violation arrests where
a full blown search is not justified where an arrest was not
necessary because an alternative summons was available or
because the arrest was a suspect pretext ' 43
In short, the Federal Constitution as interpreted by the United
States Supreme Court affords police officers a broader right to
search a suspect incidentally to a valid arrest than the New York
State Constitution as interpreted by the New York State Court of
Appeals." Pursuant to federal law, a search incident to a valid
arrest requires no additional justification.45 Under New York law,
there must be (1) a danger of the defendant being armed, (2) no
alternatives to custodial arrest such as a summons, and (3) the
39 d
39 35 N.Y.2d476, 363 N.Y.S.2d 943,323 N.E2d 183 (N.Y. 1974). A warrant
was issued for the defendant's arrest for a misdemeanor charge of driving with a
suspended license. Id Six days later an officer stopped defendant, displayed
the arrest warrant, arrested, frisked and searched the defendant and discovered a
loaded revolver. Id
4 People v. Henry, 181 Misc.2d at 692, 695 N.Y.S.2d at 895 (quoting People
v. Weintraub, 35 N.Y.2d 351 concurring opn. p. 355, 361 N.Y.S2d 897, 320
N.E.2d 636 (1974).
41 Henry, 181 Misc.2d at 694, 695 N.Y.S2d at 896.
42 Troiano, 35 N.Y.2d at 478, 363 N.Y.S.2d at 945, 323 N.E.2d at 185.
43 id
' People v. Weintraub, 35 N.Y.2d at 353, 361 N.Y.Sld at 899, 320 N.E.2d at
637.
4 Robinson, 414 U.S. 218.
2000
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arrest can not be a suspect pretext in order to justify the search of a
suspect.46
Doris Waldmann
4' Henry, 181 Misc.2d at 694, 695 N.Y.S.2d at 896.
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